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(Original Signature of Member)

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces, and
for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. SCHNEIDER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on _____

A BILL

To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy
forces, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “NIE on Iranian Proxy
5 Forces Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters
2 have helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain re-
3 gime control.

4 (2) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon
5 more battle-tested and more capable than ever be-
6 fore.

7 (3) In 2006, Hizballah's rocket and missile ar-
8 senal in Lebanon was approximately 15,000; how-
9 ever, by 2017, this figure has grown ten-fold to more
10 than 150,000.

11 (4) Iran, through various means, illicitly trans-
12 fers weapons to Hizballah.

13 (5) Iran is reportedly building missile produc-
14 tion facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous
15 rocket-producing capability for Hizballah.

16 (b) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.—Not later
17 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
18 the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
19 the Secretary of State, shall produce a National Intel-
20 ligence Estimate—

21 (1) on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria
22 and Lebanon; and

23 (2) assessing the increased threat posed to
24 Israel, other United States regional allies, and other

1 specified interests of the United States as a result
2 of such support.

3 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The National In-
4 telligence Estimate required under subsection (b) shall in-
5 clude, at a minimum, information relating to the following
6 matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical im-
7 plications for the United States and its allies:

8 (1) A description of arms or related material
9 transferred by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011,
10 including the number of such arms or related mate-
11 rial and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or
12 air, as well as financial and additional technological
13 capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.

14 (2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-con-
15 trolled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite mili-
16 tias, and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps forces,
17 operating within Syria, including the number and
18 geographic distribution of such personnel operating
19 within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders with
20 Syria and Lebanon as well as Deir al Zour, Syria.

21 (3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational
22 lessons learned based on its recent experiences in
23 Syria.

24 (4) A description of any rocket-producing facili-
25 ties in Lebanon for non-state actors, including

1 whether such facilities were assessed to be built at
2 the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian leader-
3 ship, or in consultation between Iranian leadership
4 and Hizballah leadership.

5 (5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic
6 supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or
7 otherwise aid Hizballah's acquisition or development
8 of missile production facilities, including the geo-
9 graphic distribution of such foreign and domestic
10 supply chains.

11 (6) An assessment of the provision of goods,
12 services, or technology transferred by Iran or its af-
13 filiates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or
14 otherwise produce missiles.

15 (7) An identification of foreign persons that
16 are, based on credible information, facilitating the
17 transfer of significant financial support or arms or
18 related material to Hizballah.

19 (8) A description of Russia's tactical and stra-
20 tegic collaboration with Iranian and Hizballah ele-
21 ments in Syria.

22 (9) A description of the threat posed to Israel
23 and other United States partners in the Middle East
24 by the transfer of arms or related material or other
25 support offered to Hizballah from Iran.

1 (d) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of
2 the National Intelligence Estimate required under sub-
3 section (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall sub-
4 mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
5 on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services,
6 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
7 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
8 eign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
9 Urban Development, the Committee on Armed Services,
10 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
11 a copy of such estimate.

12 (e) ARMS OR RELATED MATERIAL DEFINED.—The
13 term “arms or related material” means—

14 (1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
15 weapons or materials or components of such weap-
16 ons;

17 (2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or mate-
18 rials or components of such weapons;

19 (3) destabilizing numbers and types of ad-
20 vanced conventional weapons;

21 (4) defense articles or defense services, as those
22 terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respec-
23 tively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act
24 (22 U.S.C. 2794);

1 (5) defense information, as that term is defined
2 in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
3 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or

4 (6) items designated by the President for pur-
5 poses of the United States Munitions List under sec-
6 tion 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
7 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

8 **SEC. 3. STRATEGY.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after com-
10 pletion of the National Intelligence Estimate required
11 under section 2(b), the President shall transmit to Con-
12 gress a strategy to prevent Iran from expanding its power
13 in Syria and Lebanon.

14 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Such strategy
15 shall include plans to—

16 (1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled per-
17 sonnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and
18 Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating
19 within Syria and Lebanon; and

20 (2) work with United States allies to prevent
21 Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel access to
22 areas in Syria liberated by United States-backed
23 forces.